and the Core of Objectivist Logic
The Basis for Epistemic Normativity
(1) See Dr. Leonard Peikoff's book Objectivism: The Philosophy of Ayn Rand, page 21, for a similiar version of this argument.
(2) Dr. Leonard Peikoff's tape two of the lecture series "OBJECTIVISM: The State of the Art" was invaluable in recognizing the fact that each metaphysical law from the law of identity on is a species of the law immediately preceding it. He established the hierarchical order, I simply took the next logical step.
(3) Those of you who are familiar with the Austrian School of Economics should recognize the fact that the point I am making here is similar to that made by these economists with the idea of "demonstrated preference."
(4) I owe this argument and this point to Dr. Harry Binswanger's article "Volition as Cognitive Self-Regulation," (available as a pamphlet from Second Renaissance Books). I regard this insight as being of central importance to both the philosophy of Objectivism and to the movement. Originally, he made this point in the context of the theory of volition. Here I am simply applying it within the context of the standard of objectivity, and more broadly, within the context of the theory of logic itself.
(5) I make this argument in a far more extended fashion with respect to the issue of whether one should be rational primarily by reference to the standard of value, or by reference to the standard of objectivity in my article "The Survivalist/Flourisher-Dichotomy". One should also note the similarity between this point and the Objectivist stand regarding the proper relationship between reason and emotion. Likewise, one should consider what implications this argument has for so-called pragmatic theories of truth.
(6) One should notice, at this point, that I am grounding the standard of objectivity not in metaphysical law, but in the recognition of metaphysical law. More specifically, I am grounding it in the recognition of a causal law. In this way, my approach exactly parallels Ayn Rand's approach with respect to the Standard of Value (see her article "Introduction to the Objectivist Ethics," a chapter in her book The Virtue of Selfishness). Binswanger argues that since the recognition of such metaphysical law is itself volitional, Objectivism avoids the problem of making the Standard of Value either intrinsic (where the standard would be conceived of as being identical with the metaphysical law) or subjective (where the fact that man can act contrary to the recognition of the law is interpreted as making the choice to act in accordance with the standard arbitrary).
|The Basic Idea Behind Dual Foundationalism|
|The Basis for Epistemic Normativity/Notes|
|A Distinction Regarding Justification|
|The Nature of Epistemic Norms|
|The Core of Objectivist Logic|
©1996 by Timothy D. Chase. All rights reserved.
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